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BOOK REVIEWS 55 
Circle of Fire: The Indian War of 1865. By John 
D. McDermott. Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole 
Books, 2003. xvi + 287 pp. Illustrations, maps, 
notes, bibliography, index. $26.95. 
The Indian War of 1865 marks the last time 
Plains Indians actually took the offensive 
against white intrusions into their territory. 
Besides the basic disruption of their hunting 
grounds by thousands of outsiders en route to 
the gold fields of Montana, the immediate 
cause was the massacre of Black Kettle's band 
of Cheyennes at Sand Creek by Colorado Ter-
ritorial Volunteers in 1864. Throughout Circle 
of Fire, John D. McDermott refers to the hos-
tile tribes as "the avengers," and rightfully so. 
Although in subsequent campaigns the Indi-
ans were largely on the defensive, the war of 
1865 set the tone for the twenty-five years of 
bloodshed that culminated at Wounded Knee 
in 1890. 
McDermott does an excellent job of chroni-
cling this little-known and little-understood 
war as a whole. The book's real value, how-
ever, lies in his conclusions. He points out 
that the war was fought primarily by Volun-
teer troops who expected to be discharged at 
the end of the Civil War. Instead, they found 
themselves thrust into an Indian campaign, 
their disillusionment augmented by a new 
militancy among the Indians. But McDermott 
also notes that despite several mutinies, the 
Volunteers, when called on to fight and en-
dure, acquitted themselves admirably. 
If the campaign failed, it was largely be-
cause of the proverbial "system." McDermott 
points to a breakdown of plans and inadequa-
cies of a military organization not suited for 
the Plains. As an institution, the army learned 
nothing from this or any other Indian cam-
paign. 
McDermott offers new insights into the of-
ten deprecated career of Brigadier General 
Patrick Connor. He notes that Connor un-
derstood Indian fighting as well as any of-
ficer of his time and, left to his own devices, 
might have succeeded in breaking the Indian 
resistance. This, in turn, might have avoided 
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ensuing decades of bloodshed. But this was 
not to be. 
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